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For years the world has lived under the threat o f a nuclear war. Millions who grew up in the shadow o f the Bom b have learnt to live with and even accept the unstable 'peace' o f the nuclear 'balance o f terror' . The certainty that any nuclear attack by one o f the S u p e rp o w ers w ou ld in s ta n tly in v o lv e m assive retaliation, has helped the world to get to 1978 without a second use o f nuclear weapons.
But, how much longer can it last? Can the nuclear world survive into the 21st century? For the nam e o f the nuclear strategy gam e has changed.
The accelerating arms race and the technological advances o f the 1970s, coupled with the loom ing dangers o f the plutonium econom y, make the chances o f survival seem daily more remote. Whether, in fa c t, a nuclear holocaust will eventuate however, depends on m any factors, not least on the ability o f world forces for change prevailing over im perialism. But that time is running short there is no doubt.
This year has seen a marked deterioration in international relations and increasing tensions between West and East bloc countries, and in other areas. The Middle East continues to be a m ajor flash-point with the ever-present danger o f widening conflict; on the A frican continent and elsewhere the stru g g le fo r id e o lo g ic a l a n d m ilita ry supremacy continues. A nd the conflict between Kampuchea and Viet Nam and C hina's worsening relations with Viet Nam, are closely connected to the mutual distrust and jostling for position o f C hina and the Soviet Union.
Ironically, it was the UN first-ever Special Session on Disarm am ent in M ay which highlighted the shaky detente between the two Superpowers, neither o f whom sent their Heads o f State. Instead, President Carter attended a N ATO w ar-planning meeting in W ashington and spoke o f confrontation with the Soviet Union. Soon after, the outcry against the trials o f the Soviet dissidents was used to further a re-emergence o f Cold War hysteria and fear.
Counterforce Strategy
In the early 1960s some A m erican hawks wanted to m ove from 'deterrence' to a position o f nuclear superiority, and by the late 1960s the shift was underway. It is now clear that with the tremendous technological advances in weaponry in the 1970s and em phasis on quality rather than quantity, United States' policy has decidedly shifted t o w a r d s a 'Counterforce' s t r a t e g y .
Translated this means an unanswerable first strike capacity.
F orm er L ock h eed e n g in e e r and US weapons expert, Robert A ldridge, estimates that the US should achieve a first-strike capacity by the mid-1980s -i.e. in about seven years from now. (1) Defense Secretary, Robert M cNam ara, first expounded the new Counterforce doctrine in June 1962. A m erica's " principal m ilitary objective should be the destruction o f the enem y's m ilitary forces, not his civilian population" , he said. (2) The previous year, President Kennedy had stated that " our arms will never be used to strike the first b low " , but it was clear his Defense Secretary was elaborating a plan, and retargeting his missiles, to give the US that capability.
Twelve years later, in 1975, Defense S e cre ta ry S c h le s in g e r re p h ra s e d the doctrine. While telling a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee that the US has " no desire to develop a counterforce capability against the Soviet U nion " , he nevertheless went on: " What we wish to avoid is the Soviet U nion having a counterforce capability against the United States without our being able to h ave a com parable capability." (Em phasis added.) The President must not be limited to any single strategy, Schlesinger said, but must have the capacity f; ir " flexible response" . (3) In February 1974 Schlesinger told a Senate hearing on the m ilitary budget that " We have no announced counterforce strategy, if by counterforce one infers that one is goin g to attempt to destroy silos. We have a new ta rg e tin g d o ctr in e th a t em p h a siz es selectivity and flexibility" . (Em phasis added.) And on M ay 30_1 9 7 5 Schlesinger admitted publicly that the US would consider using nuclear w eapons first to stop com munist advances such as in Europe and Korea. (4) The new targeting doctrine is designed to make limited nuclear war acceptable -after all, it sounds more hum ane to retaliate against military targets than population areas. But the very concept o f limited nuclear war flies in the face o f the inevitable logic o f escalation to total force usage. A s the authoritative Stockholm International P e a c e R e s e a r c h I n s t it u t e ( S I P R I ) c o m m e n t e d a f t e r S c h l e s i n g e r ' s announcem ent: " In m aking nuclear war more 'flexible' (the new doctrine) makes it m ore th in k a b le , m ore to le ra b le and consequently more probable" . (5) The likelihood o f ' lim ited' nuclear strikes escalating to an all-out nuclear war in which both sides would be devastated, m eans that the only plausible reason for the US developing a counterforce capability is to a ch ie v e th e c a p a c it y to la u n ch an unanswerable first strike against the Soviet Union.
The A rm s Race
To understand how the US is m oving towards that capacity, one needs to examine the cu rren t state o f the a rm s ra ce , particularly technological developments.
The size o f the w orld's nuclear stockpiles is staggering -representing the capacity to destroy every person on earth 24 times over. Or put another way, the US could destroy every person in the Soviet U nion 40 times over and the Soviet U nion could destroy every A m erican 20 times over. These frightening, i f som ewhat ludicrous statistics illustrate the insanity o f the runaway nuclear arms race. (N ot to m ention the insanity o f diverting $400 billion a year away from spending on health, alleviating poverty and other pressing social needs.) SIPRI Director, Frank Barnaby, gives the follow ing picture o f the Superpowers' nuclear arsenals at July 1976:
United States: 2,124 strategic nuclear d e liv e ry s y s te m s -1,054 la n d -b a s e d intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on 41 strategic nuclear submarines; 414 strategic bombers. Can deliver about 8,500 independently targetable nuclear warheads. Soviet U nion: 2,404 strategic nuclear delivery systems -1,452 ICBM s; 812 SLBM s on 60 strategic nuclear submarines, about 140 strategic bombers. Can deliver about 4,000 independently targetable nuclear warheads.
In addition to their 12,000 or more strategic nuclear warheads, both the US and the Soviet U nion have tens o f thousands o f tactical nuclear weapons, m ostly more powerful than the Hiroshima atom ic bomb. (6) The key point however, is not so much the number o f strategic delivery vehicles (i.e. missiles and bombers) but the total number o f bom bs that can be delivered. And here the US is far ahead.
Most US m issiles carry multiple warheads (M IRVs -multiple individually-targeted re entry vehicles), whereas, Aldridge says, the Soviet U nion " has not mastered the ability to miniaturize hydrogen bom bs" . For example, o f the 41 US ballistic missile submarines, 31 are armed with 16 Poseidon missiles, each missile h avin g 10-14 M IRVs o f 40-kiloton yield. " That means that each o f these 31 Poseidon submarines could destroy at least 160 cities with bom bs at least twice the explosive energy that ripped into Hiroshima and N agasak i" . (7) Andrew M ack says that the US has nearly three times more nuclear warheads than the Soviet U nion, largely because o f their fiveyear lead in MIRV technology. He also points out that US missiles " are far more accurate than their Soviet counterpartscancelling the m egatonnage/throw weight 'advantages' o f the Soviet m issiles" . (8) From the time the US shifted its nuclear strategy from Deterrence to Counterforce, it has been m odernising and developing its nuclear arsenal to achieve a First Strike capacity. The whole point o f that capacity is to deliver an unanswerable first strike; to destroy the enem y' s nuclear weaponry before it can strike back. A nd that means havin g the type o f weapons with the required accuracy, w hich can hit at 'h ard' targets, i.e. land-based missiles in their hardened concrete silos, rather than 'soft' cities or industrial centres.
The US scenario for a disabling first strike was spelt out by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the Pentagon's annual statement o f 1970:
... The most ambitious [damage limiting] strategy dictates a first strike capability against an enemy's strategic offensive forces which seek to destroy as much o f his megatonnage as possible before it can be brought into play. An enemy's residual retaliation, assumed to be directed against urban-industrial targets, would be blunted still further by a combination o f active and passive defenses, including ASW (anti submarine warfare), ABMs (anti-ballistic missiles), anti-bomber defenses.... (9) Robert Aldridge details these military 'defenses' as the four m ajor interacting systems the US is developing to first strike capacity. They are:
A m iss ile a rs e n a l w ith co u n te r fo r ce a c c u r a c y to destroy land-based military targets;
An anti-subm arine (ASW) capability that can instantly k ill the S o v ie t m issilelaunching submarines;
A n a n t i-b a llis tic m issile (ABM) system and an anti bomber system to intercept residual retaliation; * A s p a ce -b a s e d sy ste m to p ro v id e c o m m u n ica tio n , navigation, weather, and intelligence inform ation, as well as to track and destroy S o v ie t e a r l y w a r n i n g , c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d navigation spacecraft.
A s stated above, the biggest technological breakthrough was the developm ent o f M IRVs. And the US is now developing a more accurate version -the M A R V -which can be remotely m anoeuvred during re-entry into the earth's atm osphere to correct any deviation from the flight path.
The current developm ent o f the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals bears out w hat has always been true o f the arms race, sometimes called the " action-reaction cy cle" . Thus four years after the H iroshim a bom b the Soviet U nion tested their first A-bomb. This was followed a day later by the form ation o f N ATO. N early six years later the Warsaw Pact was signed. In 1954 the US deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, followed three years later by the Soviet Union. In 1960 the first Polaris ballistic missile submarine was launched and fiv e y e a rs later th e fir st S o v ie t com parable ballistic m issile submarine. The Soviet U nion tested M IR V s five years after the first US tests -the US deployed them in 1970 and the USSR in 1975. By the tim e the Soviet U nion had caught up with and exceeded the US in numbers o f ICBM s and SLBMs around 1970, the Pentagon had already switched their em phasis from quantity to quality im provem ents, in line with their shift in strategy from deterrence to cqunterforce.
Trident Horror Weapon
The Trident is the US N a v y 's plan for updating the sea leg o f the strategic nuclear triad. It will be com posed o f a new fleet o f submarines, two generations o f missiles and a sophisticated com m unications system. Engineering developm ent o f Trident began in 1971. It is scheduled to be operational in 1981, with thirty subm arines planned by the 1990s. Trident will be based in the Pacific Ocean with its home port in Puget Sound, near Bangor, W ashington. Trident submarines will be 560 feet long (about two football fields) and about four stories high. Each sub w ill carry 24 missiles, h a lf as m any again as the present Polaris and Poseidon. Its longer-range missiles will give Trident ten times as much ocean area in which to hide than Poseidon.
Two generations o f Trident missiles are planned. Trident-I will have a range o f 4,000 nautical miles with a full load o f eight 100-kiloton warheads, while being as accurate as Poseidon is at 2,000 miles. Trident-I missiles will also be backfitted into 10 Poseidon subs as from 1980.
The much larger Trident-I I missiles, due by the mid-1980s, will only fit into the new Trident submarines. They will have a range o f 6,000 nautical miles, carrying fourteen 150-kiloton warheads or seven 300-kiloton M IRV warheads, with an accuracy o f 300 feet. However, by using M A R V s on the Trident-II missile, that miss distance would be whittled down to a few feet.
So each Trident sub equipped with 24 T r id e n t -I I m i s s i le s a r m e d w ith 17 m anoeuvring warheads, would be capable o f striking any point on over h a lf the earth's surface. With a typical payload o f 75-100 kilotons per warhead, on eT rid en t subm arine could destroy 408 cities or m ilitary targets with a blast fiv e times that unleashed on Hiroshima. A fleet o f 30 Trident subs would be able to deliver an unbelievable 12,240 nuclear warheads -30 times the number originally thought sufficient for strategic deterrence.
Clearly, if Trident attains the accuracies the N avy seeks, it will constitute the ultimate first-strike weapon. (10) In a Saturday R eview editorial th A m e rica n jo u r n a lis t N orm a n C o u sin s pointed out that a Trident submarine com m ander will be the third m >t powerful man in the world, next to the US and Soviet Presidents. He will control more destructive force than Britain, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, West Germany, Japan, the P h ilip p in e s , In d ia a n d P a k is ta n put together.
A u stralia's Role
In 
U .S. Bases in Australia
It has long been known that the US facilities here were an im portant part o f the US nuclear network, although their exact operations have been shrouded in secrecy. In 1974 a US N avy m agazine reported that " classified messages to Polaris-Poseidon submarines deployed in the Indian O cean" are sent from the North-West Cape Station. And as Dr. Des Ball pointed out in 1974, the North-West Cape base no longer performs a n u cle a r ' s t a b ilis in g ' ro le w h en the submarines it controls can deliver accurate hard-target weapons. (12) Out
years. Built at a cost o f $250 million, it is the largest and most im portant base o f its kind outside United States territory. One o f its major functions is to receive, analyse and transmit data from 647 early warning satellites, which are used to detect missile la u n c h in g s , and from th e ' B ig B ir d ' surveillance satellite placed over the USSR, China, India and Indo-China. Tw o private American com panies -TRW and F-Systems -control the Pine Gap operations.
The N urrungar station provides a back up function for Pine Gap. It transmits satellite early warning and reconnaissance data generated by Pine Gap via military satellite to US com m and centres.
T h e North West Cape n a v a l com m unications station transm its very low frequency (VLF) radio signals to submerged n u clea r m is s ile -c a r r y in g su b m a rin e s, enabling them to launch their missiles without surfacing to receive firing orders.
The strategic im portance o f North-West Cape will be further upgraded by a new satellite system, AN-MSC-61. When installed in 1980, it will be one o f 21 new facilities around the world form ing part o f the latest p h a s e o f th e U S d e f e n s e s a t e l li t e com m unications system. A US com pany was awarded a contract in 1977 to supply the satellite terminals. But the Australian people, Parliam ent and even the Government, were not inform ed about this upgrading until the inform ation was picked up in May 1978 from a leaked US Congress memo.
The Om ega navigation station planned for Gippsland in V ictoria also has a significant role to play in the sea leg o f the US n u clea r n etw ork . Its fu n c tio n , in co n ju n c tio n w ith s e v e n o th er O m ega stations elsewhere, is to allow world-wide allweather navigation for all kinds o f craft, both military and civilian. V LF Omega signals penetrate sea water to considerable d ep th s, so a c o m p le te ly su bm erged submarine can be guided through any seas without revealing its position.
US bases have long made Australia a target in the event o f a nuclear war. With the development o f Trident as a first-strike weapon, any pretence that the bases play a defensive rather than an offensive role, is shattered. Even journalist A lan Reid, who could hardly be classified as a left-winger, recently warned o f the dangers to Australia from the shift in US nuclear strategy:
... If Australia is to house a facility which contributes to the efficiency of a first-strike system, carrying atomic warheads, that is a quite different proposition from housing a facility which is part o f a deterrent ... It enhances the priority that the North-West Cape base would have as a target in the event of a major conflagration. (13) It is clear that the deploym ent o f Tridents in the Pacific a n d /or Indian Oceans will make North West Cape one o f the most vital strategic bases in the world. A s John Edwards points out: To achieve the accuracy necessary for a flexible response, Trident submarines will need to be positioned and the Trident-2 missile will need to be corrected in flight from land facilities. Both these operations may be conducted from Australia.
He concludes that all o f these developments will draw Australia into a role as the junior partner in the Pacific and Indian Ocean nuclear competition between the great powers, so that the exhausted traditional ANZUS alliance o f regional conventional co-operation will be replaced by a nuclear alliance -and one little known to the Australian people.
The Nuclear Connection
T u rn in g from the v e r tic a l n u clea r proliferation o f the two Superpowers, the other main areas o f concern are the increasing m ilitarisation o f the entire world t h r o u g h th e s a le a n d t r a n s f e r o f conventional, tactical weapons; and the growing horizontal nuclear proliferation th rou g h th e e x p o rt o f n u cle a r p ow er technology and materials to potential nuclear weapon countries.
Some people, including sections o f the peace m ovem ent, argue for developm ent o f nuclear power for 'safe' peaceful energy purposes, which they say is essential for econom ic growth, particularly in the Third World. A t the same time, they affirm their opposition to nuclear power being used for nuclear weapons. But is it possible to separate the peaceful and military in the real politics o f our unstable world, and above all -how can the safety o f future generations be assured while nuclear power reactors constantly produce deadly wastes which must be safely stored virtually forever?
In looking at the connections between nuclear w eapons and nuclear power, the most obvious is the danger o f nuclear weapons proliferation. But others include nuclear waste, high cost and low job creation o f both nuclear industries, extreme health hazards, nuclear industrial-governm ent connections and further steps towards a police state.
Reactor waste has received m ost attention. Yet in the US 90 per cent o f stored nuclear waste com es from the production and breakdow n/recycling o f more than 30,000 stockpiled nuclear weapons. A nd although power-generated waste will increase over the com ing years, nuclear weapons production -and therefore waste -continues to escalate.
The m ajor concerns about the dangers o f nuclear power to the health and safety o f humanity, the unsolved waste disposal problem and the inadequacies o f safeguards against the proliferation o f nuclear weapons, have yet to be answered by the pro-nuclear power lobby. And there is grow ing evidence that they cannot be satisfactorily answered, at least in the foreseeable future. For instance, a recent report from the US President's O ffice o f Science and Technology Policy stressed that it will probably be at least 10 years before any o f the suggested waste disposal methods can be tested sufficiently to warrant a decision in favour o f one form o f disposal over another. (14) The " second nuclear a ge" started when India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 (the first country in ten years to join the nuclear " club" ).
In the first nuclear age, a country that wanted a bomb had to mount an expensive complex program. In the second nuclear age, a country acquires the capability to produce a nuclear weapon with relative ease -as a by-product o f developing nuclear power. (15) The US trained 1,100 Indian nuclear scientists and engineers prior to 1974 and provided the nuclear materials used to produce the Indian bom b, while C anada p ro v id e d the eq u ip m en t and s p e c ific technology -all in the name o f " peaceful" nuclear energy.
The pro-nuclear power lobby used to argue that " reactor grade" plutonium, useable as a fuel in a civilian reactor, was not o f sufficient quality to provide the material for an atom ic bom b. But this was refuted last year by the US Energy Research and Development Adm inistration (ERDA) who confirm ed that at the N evada test site, the US has exploded a n u c l e a r d e v ic e u s in g r e a c t o r -g r a d e plutonium obtained from a nuclear power plant. (16) All a country needs to utilise its uranium -U-235 -in the manufacture o f weapons is an uranium enrichment facility.
As SIPRI Director, Frank Barnaby, states:
The major problem in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons is that the fissile material for atomic bombs can be produced on a relatively sm all scale. A 40-m egawatt electrical graphite-moderated, natural-uranium reactor, cou ld, for exam ple, produce about 20 kilograms of plutonium-239 per year, more than enough for two 20-kiloton atomic bombs (e.g. Hiroshima-size).
The components for such a reactor could be easily and secretly obtained on the open market for a cost of less than $20 million. The reactor and a small chemical reprocessing unit to remove the plutonium from the reactor fuel elem ents could be cla n d estin ely constructed and run. The nuclear industry is already beset by m ounting political and econ om ic problems. In co u n try a fte r co u n tr y p eop le are m obilising against nuclear power; and achieving significant victories. Last March the people o f conservative Kern County in C alifornia voted in a referendum 2 to 1 against the siting o f a nuclear reactor in their area. The State's energy policy now excludes new nuclear power stations. A nd on June 30 a planned nuclear plant at Seabrook, New Hampshire, was suspended, follow ing a 20,000-strong anti-nuclear protest on June 3.
The fight against nuclear power can be won through continuing m ass opposition and the effects o f the industry's own inner c o n tr a d ic tio n s . The A u s tr a lia n a n t i uranium and peace m ovem ents have a particularly important role to play. The struggle to stop Australian uranium from being mined and exported is an important national struggle to protect A boriginal land rig h ts , the h ea lth a n d s a fe ty o f all Australians, our environm ent, our civil lib e rtie s; and a g a in s t th e con tin u ed multinational exploitation o f our resources. It also has vital international im plications as a positive Australian contribution against the arms race and the spread o f nuclear weapons.
The anti-uranium m ovem ent has achieved a great deal already in its relatively short existence, including positive positions by sections o f the trade union m ovem ent and the Labor Party. A bove all, it has made uranium a public political issue and has mobilised hundreds jo f thousands onto the streets in the b ig g e s t m a rch e s and d e m o n s t r a t io n s s in c e th e V ie tn a m Moratorium. Providing this can be built on and the m ovem ent developed by greater involvem ent o f rank-and-file workers and greater unity between the labour, peace and anti-uranium movem ents, together with environm entalists and others, the Fraser Government and the pro-nuclear lobby can be defeated.
A key a sp e ct o f s tr e n g th e n in g the m ovem ent is to increase realisation that the struggle against nuclear power and nuclear weapons cannot be separated; that the struggle to keep uranium in the ground is also a struggle against the nuclear arms race and for disarmament.
T h is r e a lis a tio n is g r a d u a lly b ein g translated into united activities and a com ing together o f the anti-nuclear power and th e a n t i-w a r /p e a c e m o v e m e n ts internationally.
A t the Australian People's Disarm am ent Conference held in Sydney and M elbourne in April this year organised by the A ustralian Peace Liaison Committee, m any speakers stressed the need to develop these links, including Joe Camilleri from Melbourne, Terry P rovance from the U S A and Sheila Oakes from Britain. A t the Hiroshim a Day Rallies, visitin g Am erican biologist and antinuclear activist, Professor George Wald, pointed to the urgency o f developing unity am ong all anti-nuclear activists, to force not only an end to uranium m ining, but an end to th e n u c l e a r a r m s r a c e l e a d i n g to disarmament.
As mentioned earlier, some sections o f the peace m ovem ent accept nuclear power which they m aintain can be used safely for peaceful p u rp o se s, g iv e n a d e q u a te s a fe g u a rd s against nuclear weapons proliferation. This a ttitu d e h a s led to som e d iffe r e n c e s internationally and in Australia. The World Peace Council was for m any years the principal body uniting peace movem ents throughout the world. However, recently m any peace activists have becom e concerned at a tendency to think that all activities and m ovem ents should be directed by, or channelled through, one international body.
The World Peace C ouncil's attitude towards nuclear power, expressed in Sydney recently by its President, Rom esh Chandra (and in its journal N ew P erspectives 3/78), has led to a contradiction between its position and the most significant m ass movem ent in the capitalist countries since the Viet Nam protests. A nd this is reflected am ong members o f its Australian branch, the Australian Peace Committee. If the movem ent here is to achieve the potential for developing into a much larger mass m ovement, involvin g all those w orking for a non-nuclear w orld, one essential point is that no one organisation or ideology can attempt to attain a m onopolistic position, and that the m ovem ent is able to reach m any more people through unity around the com m on goal.
If the struggle against uranium m ining in Australia were achieved tom orrow, the vital problem o f the nuclear arms race and disarm am ent would still be confronting humanity. A n urgent task is to deepen the understanding o f anti-uranium activists about the wider dangers o f nuclear power and the present nuclear arms race, by continuing to project these issues and developing closer unity between the peace and anti-uranium movements.
For the arms race and disarm am ent to become relevant political issues ir> thp A u str a lia n co n te x t, the v ery word " disarm am ent" must be translated into identifiable goals and cam paigns relevant to A u stra lia . T h e fe e lin g a m o n g m a n y socialists that disarm am ent is not possible this side o f world socialism must also be combatted. I f one accepted that, one m ight as well sit back with arms folded and wait for w h a te v e r d is a s te r m ig h t b e fa ll. It is tantam ount to saying that nothing can be done to curb world imperialism and that national liberation struggles or the class conflict against capitalism aren't winnable, so why bother. * A n independent and non-aligned A ustralian foreign policy em bodying an end to our subservience to the dictates o f the US in particular, our military involvem ent in A SE A N , arms sales to Indonesia or any other nation for use in counter-insurgency, and a more enlightened, co-operative policy towards our South-East Asian neighbours.
* N o mining and export o f uranium.
T h ese are ta n g ib le p o lit ic a l issu es involvin g struggle against the Fraser Government and being part o f the wider struggle against im perialism . The tasks seem immense: but so is the struggle for s o c i a l i s m a g a i n s t c a p i t a l i s m a n d im p e ria lis m . T h e h a r d e s t o b s ta c le to overcome is people's feeling o f helplessness in the face o f the nuclear arms race. But we must overcom e it and develop m ass action built on the understanding that the only force standing in the w ay o f nuclear holocaust is the power o f people united in their com m on struggle.
